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ABSTRACT

Seven conflicts of purpose or procedure in the American higher education system are presented. It is argued that increasing concern for access has resulted in a new rivalry between proponents of open admissions and selective admissions, the ambitious versus the accepted. Whether the college should be designed for the student's self-fulfillment or to fulfill society's need for manpower is identified as a second conflict, as is that of methodology versus values. Other issues include: concern of the local community about the usefulness of the education paid for with tax dollars; accountability from without or within (since financial constraints have ended the era of insularity in colleges, the public now expects to participate in campus decision-making); the tendency of rights (e.g., student rights, academic tenure) to produce conflict; and the need for public participation in important decisions and the need to get the decisions made. (PHR)

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Seven Everyday Collisions in American Higher Education

Harlan Cleveland

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Harlan Cleveland, a trustee of the International Council for Educational Development, is now in his fifth year as president of the University of Hawaii. His distinguished career in public and international affairs started in Washington where during World War II he served on the U.S. Board of Economic Warfare; later he was with the Allied Control Commission in Italy. After the war he administered the United Nations aid program in China (UNRRA), distributing postwar relief in both Communist and Nationalist areas in the midst of a civil war. He returned to Washington in 1948 and was responsible for administering the first U.S. economic aid programs in six East Asian countries.

Mr. Cleveland left government service in 1953 and became executive editor and then publisher of *The Reporter* magazine. In 1956, he was appointed dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He returned to Washington in 1961 to serve under President Kennedy as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. President Johnson in 1965 appointed Mr. Cleveland as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a post which he held until 1969.

Mr. Cleveland's extensive writings include *The Overseas Americans*, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* and, most recently, *The Future Executive*.

The paper published here was delivered by Mr. Cleveland at the 1973 meeting of the Asian-U.S. Educators Conference, held from July 15-20 at Chiang Mai, Thailand.

I.

Picture a large traffic intersection where seven streets come together, each carrying traffic both ways—fourteen directions in all. In real life, the nearest analog might be the Etoile in Paris, where all day long, in a massive tangled slow-moving complexity, Parisians weave and shout and play "chicken" as they circle the great triumphal arch and disturb the unknown dead with their klaxons. Place the college or university executive out in the middle of this confusion, with the assignment to analyze it and keep things moving.

The academic executive has always been a man or woman in the middle—controlling traffic by pointing directions, negotiating priorities, allocating scarcities, arbitrating arguments and calming tempers. Until very recently the executive stood, if not on a pedestal, at least on a traffic island—protected from the bumpers, shielded from the headlights, raised above the honking and hollering.

But now the central traffic island has been swept away, and the academic executive weaves and dodges among his constituencies—persuading, cajoling, lobbying, testifying, arbitrating, bargaining, averting where he can and postponing where he can't the seven everyday collisions in American higher education.

Four of the intersecting arteries carry collisions of purpose—issues about power and preference, about who gets access to the skills and symbols of advancement and affluence—issues like those in the wider polity, but intensified by concentration on a campus. The other three collision courses intersect at points of procedure. The arguments about purpose, about what the academy is for, are old familiar vehicles, but driven now by all kinds of people who look different and think in different ways from the old elites who piloted and profited from higher education. The procedural collisions are also worth our special attention—both because arguments about procedure are so often surrogates for disagreements about policy, and because the three main procedural issues now bedeviling the academy are, I think, fundamentally new to higher education.

A word about my point of view: What follows is written after four years in office by the president of a public university system in one—a comparatively small one—of fifty States. From observation in other states and professional contact with other university presidents and statewide coordinators of higher education (in Hawaii the two functions are combined in the same person), I think most of my continental generalizations from insular experience may apply better to public than to private colleges and universities.

"Where I stand depends on where I sit." Where I sit is in the midst of a statewide system of public higher education—one full university campus with 33 Ph.D.'s and 70 Master's degrees, seven two-year community colleges, one four-year liberal arts college in being and another scheduled to start in 1975. Hawaii's mid-Pacific location and its unique ethnic mix have made it a national center for marine science and Asian studies. A virtual monopoly of postsecondary education in the Islands has made the University of Hawaii the social and professional escalator for the early-arriving Polynesians, the

children and grandchildren of indentured immigrants from the Orient, and the more recent arrivals from the Philippines, the Pacific Islands, and the U.S. Mainland. Because the University system grew so fast in the 1960s, the sudden halt in its growth in 1973 was even more of a shock than the comparable comeuppance experienced by other public university systems. The specific reasons for this sudden turning are local and exotic. The educational dilemmas that austerity has sharpened are probably universal.

II.

Collision No. 1, of course, is between *the few and the many*. This familiar confrontation is the stuff of social history in every age. It has been muted in American colleges and universities by a prosperity in which, for most of the past generation, there seemed plenty of room for all.

Nobody now argues that only an elite should go to college. It is no longer respectable even to oppose the principle of universal access to postsecondary education. The new question is this: how far should how many go? And in allocating state and federal resources, how far should the chance for the many to go beyond high school pre-empt the chance for a growing number of the few to go beyond college to advanced graduate and professional training?

The earlier answer to the question, "Who should have a chance at higher education?" was clear enough. The brighter children of the rich and highly born had to be trained to manage things, and to think of themselves as leaders. Those from other families could content themselves with physical labor or, if they were unusually talented, with specialized and preferably manual artisanry. Later on, as the more industrialized societies required more educated people, the doctrine gained favor that all should get an equal start, but if some fell

behind because of early disadvantages or racial discrimination or inability to speak correctly the language of the governing classes, that was not regarded by those in charge as particularly serious because the need was still very great for common labor and skills not requiring general education.

But now, machines are taking over much of the physical drudgery, and computers, calculators and photocopiers are taking over more and more of the clerical and analytical tasks. Those rows of people copy-typing, doing arithmetic, and operating switchboards, or stamping and moulding and drilling and packaging, are becoming rows of machines doing those things, only faster and more dependably. The people are freed for more interesting work, for jobs that require thinking and planning and internalized ethical standards. Brains have to tell the stupid machines, which after all can only differentiate between zero and one, what to do and when and how, and fix them when they fail. And people have to solve the puzzle of working cooperatively with other people, studying how the whole system works so as to fit their work with the work of others.

The pyramidal structure in which recommendations go up and orders come down turns out to be no match for the size and complexity of the problems people now want to tackle. Modern organization systems are increasingly moved by a new dynamic of consultation, collective bargaining and lateral persuasion. These horizontal processes multiply the requirement for leadership and open up opportunities for any one with imagination, aptitude and self-starting energy to become tomorrow's agent of change.

In short, the kinds of jobs high school graduates used to do are increasingly done by automatic systems, and the kinds of jobs left for people to do require education and experience beyond the secondary level. Some of the new requirements for "college-level" training might well be met in the

secondary schools. But the standardization of curricula, the levelling of salaries, and the subordination of professionalism seem to be producing high schools less inclined and less able than ever before to prepare their compulsory students to cope with the new world of work-complexity.

And that is why, in the more industrialized societies, most young people will have to go to college, some kind of college. That is why most American parents today, if you ask them which of their children are candidates for postsecondary education, will express the hope that all their children will sooner or later go to college.

For some years it has been the declared policy of the State of Hawaii that "Every citizen who has completed high school or reached the age of 18, if he or she desires a chance for higher education, should find that chance somehow somewhere in the statewide system of public higher education called the University of Hawaii." In the Education Amendments of 1972, the United States Congress declared it to be national policy that every American is entitled to equal educational opportunity reaching two years beyond the compulsory 12 grades.

These new social intentions, expressed as "open admissions" policies in many public colleges, were the major engine of growth for American higher education during the 1960s. In parallel with the expansion of the whole postsecondary population from 2.3 million in 1950 to 8.3 million in 1972, graduate and professional schools were booming too. The demands for specialists to work in industry and the public service (including the armed services) seemed insatiable. And the popularity of higher education was such that public budgets and private giving kept pace with both the rising intake of freshmen and the rising production of Ph.D.'s and professional degrees.

Then the bubble burst. Campus disruptions, swelling budgets, and the intolerance of educators for systematic planning, all contributed to the backlash. Governments and givers started asking before granting it how their money would be spent, and the dawn of accountability came up like thunder.

Quite suddenly, a pervasive austerity sharpens all the dilemmas which had been buried or by-passed in the continuous growth. If there is not enough money to pay all the professors (even, in some institutions, those with claims to academic tenure), it is no longer possible to teach all the students who want to study and offer all the required programs without a very large increase in the faculty's teaching workload. Faculty-administration committees, searching for "warm bodies" and programs to cut off which are less central to the institution's future than the programs in which the committee members themselves are employed, quickly realize that "raising standards" would result in fewer students and permit the elimination of less experienced, untenured teachers; even more of the lower-division teaching could then be done by graduate students, for the graduate programs on which the institution's general repute depends must of course be maintained. But the university's external critics, noting the sudden recession in the demand for graduate degree-holders and counting the comparative voting strength of the many and the few, counter with proposals to drop the more elitist forms of training in favor of wider opportunity for lower-division and community college students. More parents are interested in opportunities for freshmen than for Ph.D. candidates; more voters are moved by a politician's defense of vocational education than by the pleas of the graduate faculty.

In recent months the U.S. Government has systematically combed the federal budget and excised all the money for graduate students it could find, on the premise that in all but

a few specialized fields there are too many educated Americans already. The across-the-board cut discriminates against a whole generation—it says that students ready for graduate work now should work for those who already have the advanced degrees, not compete with them. And it discriminates against the upward mobile parts of America: families which are just beginning to produce graduate-school material are told that their children should settle for second-class jobs under the scions of families which "arrived" earlier.

So the ancient rivalry between the few and the many is reincarnated as open admissions versus selective admissions, the ambitious versus the accepted, the community colleges versus four-year colleges versus graduate schools, as they compete for higher education dollars now that the sky is no longer the limit.

III.

The new constraints have also intensified the traditional controversies about what should be taught.

As James A. Perkins puts it, new *entrance* criteria based on social equality are on collision course with *exit* criteria, which are an expression of meritocracy. In his address at the centennial celebrations of the University of Canterbury, he pointed out that the three great values of equality, meritocracy and academic standards must achieve a new balance in all university affairs, particularly admissions.[1] To the aca-

[1] James A. Perkins, "Is the University an Agent for Social Reform?" Paper delivered to a symposium held by the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, as part of its centennial celebrations in May 1973.

demic administrator, part of whose task is to help maintain the academic standards, Collision No. 2 presents itself in these terms: *Should "college" be designed for the student's self-fulfillment, or to fulfill society's needs for manpower?*

A high proportion of those who with their gifts or tax payments purchase the right to criticize the academy seem to feel that the academy's main purpose is to produce people in vocational categories that "fit" the job market, or somebody's idea of what the job market ought to be.

Even if there were agreement that the purpose of higher education is to prepare students for their jobs after college, the science of manpower planning is so primitive that neither the college nor its students can have much confidence in official projections. Three years ago, there was still much talk of the teacher shortage; today there is clearly a glut of would-be teachers. In Italy, I understand, an unusual number of graduate lawyers are becoming policemen. In America, a growing proportion of Ph.D.'s are joining community college faculties. That is not the way the manpower planners would have planned it. (But is it bad for Italian policemen to be sensitive to legal process, or for lower-division teachers to have personal experience in advanced research?)

In these circumstances students are increasingly, and wisely, inclined to hedge their bets by using their college years as preparation for Life as well as livelihood. Despite some current unemployment most of their experience has led them to believe that making a living will not be all that difficult. Contemporary American youth are the first generation in the history of mankind to be searching, *en masse*, for the answer to a new question: After affluence, what? Part of the contemporary crisis in vocational education is its inability to define its role in industrialized societies where both instructors and their industrial sponsors are still hung up on the moral value of obsolescent forms of manual labor, while

the students are searching not just for a meal ticket but for Meaning.

In the liberal arts programs, undergraduates are unwittingly creating budgetary problems by flocking into courses on art and religion, in colleges which had planned for them to take biophysics and political science. If society's needs, as determined in the short run by the market or the government, are not being served, because students are searching not so much for knowledge as for themselves, where should the college executive be allocating the money? Most academics would let the students choose, not just because that is the line of least resistance but because of an intuition that the student is as likely to be the best forecaster of his or her future lifework as a fluctuating job market or a government statistician. But internal budget allocations based on this permissive doctrine are not likely to be popular in legislatures or Lions Clubs downtown.

When students "vote with their feet" by crowding into the lectures on The Meaning of Life and boycotting the courses in econometrics, they are also illustrating Collision No. 3: *Education for methodology or for values*? The academy's students, and its outside critics too, notice that the vertical academic disciplines, built around clusters of related methodologies, are not in themselves very helpful in solving problems. No real-world problem can be fitted into the jurisdiction of a single academic department. As every city-dweller knows, we know every specialized thing about the modern city except how to "get it all together" to make the city livable, efficient and safe. The real world is by nature interdisciplinary.

As they awaken to problem-solving, students therefore gravitate to those of the academy's offerings which seem to promise an interdisciplinary approach. These offerings are often disappointing. A course in environmental problems

may be taught by an evangelist less eager to train analysts than to recruit zealots. Team-teaching by experts in several methodologies may leave the students as the classroom's only interdisciplinary thinkers -just as the patient in a modern hospital comes to feel he is the institution's only generalist. Still, many students prefer offerings that promise to cut across the vertical structures of method and help them construct homemade ways of thinking about the situation as a whole.

The revolt against methodology is also powered by the quickening interest in ethics, which started long before Watergate. A growing number of students come to college after some life experience–in the army or on the job or in a commune. They are groping for purpose, for effective ways of asking "Why?" and "Where are we supposed to be going anyway?" Disciplines which seem neutral about purpose, modes of analysis which are equally usable to kill Vietnamese or build low-cost housing, make these students uncomfortable. They reason from recent history that systems analysis and the scientific method may be too well adapted to taking us rapidly and efficiently to where we won't want to be when we get there.

The students may not be wrong. Yet they face an impressive phalanx of opposition to their instinct that the vertical disciplines should be stirred together in problem-solving, purpose-related combinations. The very structure of academia is against them. Access to academic journals, collegial admiration, and promotion and tenure are all to be had by toeing the disciplinary line. And the external critics are for once on the professors' side: the division of knowledge into watertight compartments enabled the alumni to develop self-esteem and a decent living, so why does the curriculum have to be controversial?

IV.

As the academy gropes for ways to broaden and deepen the student's college experience, without inflating the budget, its teachers and executives become aware of another dilemma sharpened by their attempt to do too many things with too little money. Collision No. 4 comes when *the natural cosmopolitanism of the academy meets the natural parochialism of its parish.*

"Are they teaching our kids to do something useful up there at the university, or are they trying to save the world?" On campus the two aims are not seen to conflict; but the articulate audience of taxpayers, givers, parents, alumni and professionals, business and political leaders will generally give an absolute priority to (a) instruction (b) for local residents (c) for local service.

The comparative political popularity of community colleges compared to university campuses is traceable precisely to this natural prejudice: their students are seen as nearby residents, learning locally relevant skills on campuses devoted to teaching undefiled by "all those other things" that people seem to do in the more complex institutions.

In many states the public institutions have adopted strict limits on the numbers of out-of-state residents that can be admitted; most states now discriminate against out-of-state students by charging them higher tuition. Affirmative recruitment of nonresident students is increasingly frowned upon, though a really good athlete is still acceptable regardless of origin. (Localitis in student admissions is becoming harder to administer as the courts enforce the equal-treatment clause of the U.S. Constitution. Eighteen-year-old adulthood has also made it easier for out-of-state students to emancipate

themselves from faraway families and become "instant locals.")

In the early stages of a university's growth, its position in its community as emblem and engine of upward mobility can produce, as it has in Hawaii, an extraordinary willingness to invest in higher education. If they are seen as service to the parish, even expensive innovations become financeable. Despite an austerity budget which actually provides fewer dollars this year than last year for the whole University of Hawaii system, we are starting this Fall (1973) a new School of Law and a four-year School of Medicine. They survived the Draconian budget cuts because the State of Hawaii is seen to be still a colony of the U.S. Mainland until it can offer its own citizens a chance at professional education–and in the process, produce its own lawyers and physicians.

Second thoughts about population growth, in states such as Oregon and Hawaii, deepen the fears of in-migration. Young people who come to study on campus may remain to compete off-campus for jobs and housing, and add an unpredictable factor to the otherwise familiar equation of local politics. The fear is not focused only on students. In the upward mobile communities especially–Hawaii is again an example–pressure grows to limit to local residents the recruitment of teachers, librarians and administrators.

The collision of local with federal purposes has been obscured for two decades by the great subsidies with which Washington has developed and pre-empted a generation of scientific talent to work on research oriented to national needs. As long as the subsidies kept coming, the university's parish could have pride in providing a home for complex scientific instruments and creating ever larger programs of graduate instruction and research. But now that the federal grants in many fields are drying up at the source, the maintenance of graduate excellence and the costs of using the

accelerators and telescopes and oceanographic ships are increasingly matters for state and local decision.

The local parish's breadth of view, and length of vision, are especially tested when it comes to the academy's international role. In the 1950s and early 1960s, American colleges and universities were deeply and enthusiastically involved in defense research, foreign aid projects, and international cultural exchange. Overseas training programs, Study Abroad, the Experiment in International Living, and the Peace Corps all derived their strength from on-campus interest in international service. Institutions vied with each other to accept larger numbers of foreign students from a wider variety of nations. Before the University of Hawaii was a major institution in American terms, it was already a Mecca for students from Asia and the Pacific Islands, and the natural home for the federally financed East-West Center.

But in many institutions the international programs are languishing now. The long war in Vietnam, cumbersome foreign aid procedures, the decline of student excitement about internationalism, the loss of interest by some big foundations, a reduced sympathy with economic development, and a growing preoccupation with urban and racial and ethical issues at home, all have been part of the change in mood. Federal policy has aggravated the trend: a few months after the visit of President Nixon to Peking, his budget analysts cut out support for the teaching of Mandarin in American summer schools.

More than ever before, it is left to the local parish to decide whether it is worth while to play an international role. In Hawaii this choice is especially traumatic, for Hawaii's ethnic mix and geographical position have long made it the rhetorical "Hub of the Pacific." The rise of Japan, the opening of China, the prospect for negotiations in Korea, a precarious peace in Southeast Asia, and the burgeoning

ambitions of the Pacific Islands, together with new technologies such as jumbo jets and communications satellites, all suggest a large and exciting international future for Hawaii's University. That prospect does not of course have to collide with "What are you doing for our kids?"; an international outlook is the natural orientation for an island institution. Yet the issue is still in doubt: after the University of Hawaii had spent three years building an educational satellite communication system that now connects most of the postsecondary colleges in the Pacific Islands, the austerity axe has fallen this year on the promising PEACESAT project.

V.

It is convenient to distinguish between what a college or university is supposed to do, and how it sets about to do it. The distinction can easily be overdrawn. Means and ends always interact. Yet the four collision courses already suggested do center in the purposes the academy sees itself or is seen as serving. The other three have to do with how those purposes are served, or even whether they can be served by an organization such as the modern American college or university is becoming.

What the academy teaches, to whom, for what purpose—these are questions of lively public interest. The dilemmas are so interesting and higher education has become so expensive that concerned nonacademic folk of many categories have been led to intervene deeply in the processes by which "academic" decisions are made. This sets up Collision No. 5, in which *the outside insistence on "accountability" meets the academy's insistence on "campus independence."*

Until very recently, there was a remarkably wide consensus—embracing governors and legislators, parents and alumni,

employers and givers as well as trustees, students, faculty, and college executives—that academic planning and budgeting required such indecipherable brainwork that they had to be left to the resident intellectuals. The aims were not in controversy: teaching was not yet seen to be in competition with research, the search for new knowledge was still seen as compatible with the sharing of existing knowledge with wider communities.

Academic planning in these circumstances was an exercise in uncosted visions. Typically, a faculty-administration committee assisted by a galaxy of task forces would compile a list of each unit's most defensible ambitions, and present them as a "plan" with the fiscal and physical implications to be worked out later and the timing also unclear. Proposals to build new buildings or fund new programs could then be justified by referring back to the Academic Development Plan.

The system worked well as long as resources were more plentiful than imagination. The general dimensions of the college or university could be controlled pretty well by selective admissions, and the search for new knowledge was generously funded by private foundations and the Federal Government. But "open access" broke open the budget, especially in the public institutions, and as the 1960s ran out, the Federal Government, most of the states, and the big foundations all decided, for related reasons, to be less open-handed in their support for college and university budgets.

Suddenly the privileged sanctuary of academic planning was invaded by demands to show cause why more students could not be taught, why classrooms and faculty offices could not be occupied more hours of the day, why some subjects needed to be taught at all. Federal agencies,

inhibited for decades past by the concept of academic freedom, found that they could ask accountability questions without violating anyone's constitutional rights. Quite suddenly, the academy had to devise new systems to quantify and computerize its self-perceptions, cast up the costs and benefits of proposed new programs, expose its policy choices to public view, and apply to itself those techniques of program evaluation and systems analysis which had previously been taught only to students learning to manage organizations other than colleges and universities.

Aggression across the academic frontier has been hastened by the search for off-campus relevance by the academics themselves. As members of the academy rode out to expose the polluters, advocate more community planning, stop the war and keep the government honest, they released the reciprocal energies of community leaders who saw some wrongs to be righted in the academy too. Campus disruptions also reduced the respect for "campus independence;" outsiders could clearly see how fragile the on-campus consensus, and how vulnerable the institutions of self-government, were turning out to be.

The more the outsiders learn about college and university management, the more excuses they find to intervene in it. Even a decade ago, it was widely accepted that professors were special people whose working conditions could not be measured by the forty-hour week or the twelve-month calendar. Obviously the time spent in class was no more significant in judging how hard a scholar-teacher was working than the time spent in court or the operating room in measuring the effort of a trial lawyer or a surgeon. But suddenly the obvious is no longer so evident. As faculty workload practices come to be compared in public controversy with the way other kinds of people work and are paid, the academy's critics find much to criticize in a system which seems to define success as teaching less for more pay.

The controversy about faculty workload is not, as some of the academy's defenders claimed at first, the result of massive public misunderstanding of how a professor lives and works (the citizen, informed that a professor's teaching commitment is nine credit-hours, saying, "Well, that's a pretty good day's work"). It is an historically inevitable consequence of the academy's explosive growth—no longer a smallish community of scholars, now a large multi-purpose organization with only a minority of its professional staff seriously engaged in scholarship, and a majority inclined to regard themselves as employees of the academy rather than as part of its management. As long as the faculty's emphasis was on the quality of service, the community served could judge the academy by instinct, not by arithmetic. But as soon as the faculty is seen to be preoccupied with its own wages and working conditions, the community (and its political representatives) will want to know with some quantitative precision what increased obligations to teach are part of the salary bargain.

The need to rationalize open-ended academic planning with finite resource constraints has spurred the states to pull together in statewide systems the planning and coordination of each jurisdiction's colleges and universities, public and private. A good many states have adopted, or are likely soon to adopt, a setup like that in Hawaii, where a single governing board is responsible for all of public higher education. In the other states, tight coordination of all academic programs and institutional budgets is in force or in prospect. In the Education Amendments of 1972, the U.S. Congress has urged each state to have a Commission on Postsecondary Education embracing not only the public systems but private and parochial colleges, industrial training programs, and profit-seeking proprietary schools.

The scrutiny of outsiders is here to stay; college faculties and administrations can no longer expect to receive broad

grants of general-purpose funds; campus independence is permanently compromised by accountability. But for public colleges and universities, the new layer of statewide planners may help to avert direct collisions between campuses and political/financial decision-makers. The new division of labor can be that campuses (executives and faculty members, with some student participation) retain substantial autonomy in deciding what is taught and researched, but fit into a wider planning-budgeting system when it comes to deciding which plans to bet on, and how much all the plans can cost.

VI.

It is common observation that each of the academy's immediate constituents—student, faculty members, staff, administrators, alumni, and contributors—shares the conviction that its members' rights may be neglected unless they organize to remind the academy about them. Believing, with Mr. Justice Holmes, that "liberty is secreted in the interstices of procedure," the constituents are more and more inclined to get the academy's processes written down on paper. Collision No. 6 is *the tendency of rights to produce rigidities*.

The most obvious example is academic tenure. The notion that a scholar-teacher should achieve lifetime security got started as a way to guarantee his intellectual independence. Now most employees in large organizations—corporations, government agencies, foundations—have a permanent lien on their jobs; and every citizen is supposed to have an enforceable right to freedom of thought and speech which only scholars could once count upon. Academic tenure is thus decreasingly distinguishable from other forms of job s urity—and is granted more automatically, and to far more categories of teachers, than it used to be. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, predicting static enrollments and therefore a slowdown in new hiring, forecasts "a

nationwide full-time faculty in 1985 that is 80 percent tenured and 90 percent in 1990–higher education will be substantially 'tenured-in' ".[2]

The growing tendency of tenured faculty to regard themselves as the academy's employees, not its co-managers, leads to practices that would have seemed grotesque a decade or two ago. Thus it is (at the University of Hawaii, for example) that the academic faculty has traded union representation for collegiality and voted to organize and bargain at arm's length with the University–which an earlier generation of professors would have defined as consisting essentially of themselves. The consequence can only be a standardization of salaries, an emphasis on seniority rather than merit, contractual definitions of workload and leave policies, formal rules about faculty consultation and grievances, and generally a pattern of written regulations in domains where a benign ambiguity previously seemed better to serve the interest of the faculty. In public institutions at least, the faculty's right to organize and bargain collectively, if exercised, seems bound to drain real power *both* from the faculty *and* from the university administration and trustees, as the basic bargain is struck between a union negotiator and a representative of a governor's office, ratified by a legislature.

Conflict about rights on campus engages not only the executive and legislative arms of government, but the judiciary as well. A growing proportion of all academic people who don't get what they want go to court about it. As this is written, I am a defendant in a dozen lawsuits, either as University President or as an individual, usually both. The plaintiffs include a student who received a C and is suing for a B in a business administration course, faculty members who

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[2] The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *Governance of Higher Education: Six Priority Problems*, New York: McGraw-Hill, April 1973, p. 54

charge that adverse judgments on their new or continued employment were based on their sex or race, a professor who does not wish to retire at the mandatory retirement age, and a parent who thinks that policies for admission for our laboratory school, an elementary and secondary school managed for experimental purposes by the University's College of Education, should be subjected to the full range of rule-making process described by the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act.

Some of this activity may result from what one colleague calls "social ambulance chasing;" that is, lawyers collect plaintiffs and sponsor class actions to claim violation of newly popular constitutional rights, taking the cases on contingent fees that need not be paid unless the case is won, or the University can be induced to settle out of court. But, though there may be some temptations to generate clients this way as the no-fault principle dries up the negligence business, most such suits reflect honest feelings of ravished rights in a litigious age. Some of the litigation is honestly political: the Establishment may preach the virtues of ambiguity and administrative flexibility, but faculty unions and their lawyers sense that it is the administrators who get to interpret the ambiguities and exercise the flexibility.

As students come to consider themselves not as objects but as subjects of higher education, they too organize to insist on formal processes and written regulations. Student governments and student activity boards, which now control very large resources in some institutions, are resorting to incorporation to protect their independent discretion. Disciplinary action resulting from conduct damaging to the institution is now unthinkable unless the college or university has, in the Scranton Commission's language, "promulgate[d] a code making clear the limits of permissible conduct and announce[d] in advance what measures it is willing to employ in response to impermissible conduct." Even so, sanctions for

bad behavior will be challenged unless they have been defined after formal notice, publication of written rules, a waiting period, and public hearings, and the rules contain provision for public charges, peer judgments, confrontation of accusers, right of counsel, appeal to higher authority and eventually to the courts.

The growing dedication to formal legal process is infectious. Some academic departments, not usually the better ones, have even taken to recording formal votes and conducting curriculum discussions by *Robert's Rules of Order*. The judgment whether several young professors would be recommended for tenure turned, in one recent departmental hassle, on whether the 1893 or the 1970 edition of *Robert's Rules* should prevail.

If faculty members elect a union to write down all their rights in a contract, the non-faculty staff and the graduate assistants will not be far behind; in Wisconsin, indeed, graduate assistants broke the ice and organized first. Austerity may limit the academy's capacity to teach and do research, but the academy's legal staffs will grow for sure. The duer the process, the more legal talent the institution and each of its constituencies will require. The less money there is for higher education, the more people will consult lawyers to learn how the Constitution and the courts can help them get their fair share.

Something very important is happening here. Society has assigned a unique role to colleges and universities—a role which requires a maximum of self-governance. Yet the whole idea that colleges and universities are competent to govern themselves, to protect the rights and enforce the obligations of their members, is now in question.

What is questioned is a hardy chunk of conventional wisdom, the product of several hundred years of academic

development. It is a trio of notions: that in a company of intellectuals, precise rules of behavior are nonsense; that valid judgments about rights and responsibilities within the academy can be made only by peers; and that within parameters set by peers, individual members of the academic club are free to inquire, to think, to teach, and to speak out in a socially protected sanctuary–and to do it for life.

In earlier times the need for this special protection was apparent. The academy sheltered most of society's prime change-agents. If every inquiry into the unknown, every teaching of the unusual, every advocacy of the unpopular was to be branded as heresy or treason, the promise of the Age of Reason could never be realized and the Enlightenment would be but a brief interlude between one Dark Age and another.

The academy still harbors many of society's would-be change-agents. But their shelter is being stripped away. The reasons derive directly from the insistence of the many that the academy not remain an enclave of the few. Higher education now does hundreds of things besides search for truth and try to interest students in thinking about it. Colleges and universities perform, that is to say, many functions which neither require nor deserve the special protection of a social sanctuary.

The blurring of the line between academy and community has even withered the notion that education has to take place on a campus; the many dry runs for "open universities" and "external degrees" bear witness. College and university administration has extended far beyond the effort to achieve a collegial consensus within an academic community, to embrace lobbying with legislatures and political executives, and trying to influence taxpayers, private givers, philanthropists and contracting officers. Many university people are really extensions of a government agency, not searching for basic knowledge but helping the sponsoring agency get

something done without breaking through its manpower ceiling. A growing proportion of campus decision-making is handled off-campus, by trustees, state coordinators, private benefactors, union negotiators, arbitrators, political leaders, the courts, the Congress, and the Federal Office of Management and Budget.

The dependence of insiders on relations with outsiders is bound to fragment the academy's solidarity and reduce its comparative hold on the loyalty of its individual members. One consequence is a preoccupation inside the academy with rights at the expense of responsibilities. In the past four years I have greeted dozens of federal visitors mandated to protect the rights of special categories of university people. They almost never ask whether the persons in the protected categories are performing effectively in their assigned functions. Small wonder: where rights are routinely appealed *from* the academy, responsibilities *to* the academy are bound to get lost in the shuffle.

VII.

The belated arrival of the U.S. Constitution on the American campus, which mostly dates from the early 1960s, has opened the doors of decision-making to many groups that were excluded before. One result is Collision No. 7. From the college executive's angle of vision, the new question is: *How do you get everybody in on the act and still get some action?*

The dilemma is not unique to the academy. Throughout our society, the puzzle is how to reconcile the growing demand for public participation in important decisions with the need to get the decisions made. It is easy to consult forever, producing a warm feeling by never deciding against any of the participators. It is also possible to act without consultation, but the result may also be a non-action, as the

decision comes to be nullified by opposition strengthened by the argument that the opponents were not asked for their opinion ahead of time.

The argument for consulting the affected groups before acting to affect them does not rest merely on the need to head off predictable opposition. Most decisions in modern society are so complicated that the responsible executive cannot possibly predict all the consequences of his actions. The main value of advance consultation is that it improves the quality of decisions by the person (or nation) who consults. But there is no dependable formula to guide the consulter, except perhaps that antique and useful principle, the Golden Rule: If someone else were to do to you what you are about to do to him, would you think he should consult you first?

The danger was always there that wider participation would make for more sluggish decision-making; one can only hope that the higher quality of decisions makes up for the delay. A less obvious danger in participatory modes of action is that most people prefer the known to the unknown, and resist any change that is not of clear and present benefit to them. One of the political ironies of our era is that the openness of decision-making routinely advocated by radicals inhibits the radical changes they espouse.

In a now-defunct experiment in undergraduate education at the University of Hawaii, a community of students and faculty decided to recruit new faculty members by applying the participatory doctrine of one-person-one-vote. That gave the students the majority voice; the students had a limited acquaintance with the national market for first-rate unorthodox teacher-scholars; they therefore voted to hire mostly local instructors with whose known unorthodoxies they had learned to be comfortable. Only after the reviewing administrator chided the self-styled radicals for their narrow tradi-

tionalism did they recommend the recruitment of two professors of national repute.

With most groups on most subjects, wide and open consultation tends to produce very modest, careful reforms, and inhibits major departures from tradition. If every educational innovation required a broad consensus in advance, colleges and universities would be even less experimental than they are.

"Any society can atrophy and decline. The capacity of a society to assure its own self-renewal is a critical test of it. Higher education has a part to play in the passing of this test by the United States." The Carnegie Commission in June 1973 ranks as one of American higher education's five major purposes "the critical evaluation of society–through individual thought and persuasion–for the sake of society's self-renewal," and rates higher education's performance on this count as "quite uneven in the past and uncertain for the future."[3]

Bureaucratic rigidity, political intervention and participatory resistance to change seem bound to limit the contribution of many American colleges and universities to society's self-renewal. Today many students, faculty and staff members, not to mention contractors, foundations, business firms and government agencies, still find the public academy useful because it has the flexibility to accommodate their ambitions and encourage social change. Many members of the academy, those who pay and those who are paid, are there because somebody had the discretion to make some exception to some traditional but fortunately unwritten practice. But if the practices are all to be committed to paper, codified in

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[3] The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *The Purposes and the Performance of Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 2000*, New York: McGraw-Hill, April 1973, p.1.

laws and executive orders and Board decisions and collective bargaining agreements and student contracts, none of which can be changed without cumbersome processes or by-passed without lawsuits, the resulting hardening of the arteries can only be devastating for the academy's role as the incubator of social invention.

American civilization is probably healthy enough to survive the arteriosclerosis of its academies. Some private colleges and universities, those that can raise enough nongovernment money to resist state and federal entanglements and whose faculties retain a primary tie to their institutions, may have to provide a larger share of society's critical imagination. Government agencies, industrial training schools, R & D companies, and some 600 "think tanks"—centers for integrative research and advanced thinking—already occupy sizable salients of the research frontier and make a growing contribution to graduate and postgraduate education. These alternatives to colleges and universities will quite likely expand to fill any vacuum created by the inability of the muscle-bound academy to cope with, and prescribe for, social change.

As the traffic becomes more viscous along the arteries of higher education, it is quite likely that Americans in search of exciting instruction, new knowledge, relevant values and better solutions to their social frustrations will look harder for alternate routes. Yet the bulk of young and older Americans—and many foreigners too—will spend part of their lives in and around our colleges and universities.

For the academic executive, the man or woman in the midst of a university's traffic pattern, the purposes of higher education are clear enough, and easy to write down in ways that obscure the coming collisions of purpose and procedure. The Carnegie Commission listed them anew in a June 1973 report: to provide educational opportunities for the individ-

ual student, to create an environment for developmental growth, to advance human capability, to enlarge educational justice, to transmit and add to learning and wisdom, to encourage the critical evaluation of society through individual thought and persuasion.[4] But the academic executive cannot dismiss as easily as the Commission did the difficulty of reconciling these purposes with each other, with governmental aims and with resource constraints. "We see no special problems," said the Commissioners, "for the continuation of 'pure scholarship' provided academic freedom is protected against internal and external attacks upon it, and a reasonable supply of resources is available."[5] But what of scholarship burdened with budget cuts in the crossfire of political attack?

More useful than generalized purposes, for the creator of new traffic patterns in colleges and universities, is a set of attitudes which are, I think, indispensable to the management of complexity:

- The notion that crises are normal, tensions are promising, and complexity is fun;
- The understanding that paranoia and self-pity are reserved for nonexecutives;
- The conviction that there must be some more upbeat outcome than would result from the sum of available expert advice; and
- A sense of personal responsibility for the situation as a whole.

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[4] Ibid. p. 1.

[5] Ibid. p. 98

International Council for Educational Development

The International Council for Educational Development (ICED) is an international non-profit association of persons with a common concern for the future of education and its role in social and economic development.

ICED's three major interests are strategies for educational development; the modernization and management of systems of higher education; and the international programs and responsibilities of higher education. In each area, ICED's purposes are to identify and analyze major educational problems shared by a number of countries, to generate policy recommendations, and to provide consultation, on request, to international and national organizations.

ICED's activities are directed by James A. Perkins, chief executive officer and chairman of an international board. Philip H. Coombs is vice chairman. The headquarters office is in New York City.

The main support for ICED to date has come from the Ford Foundation, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, UNICEF, and the Clark Foundation.

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